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Identifying and Measuring Technical Inefficiency Factors: Evidence from Unbalanced 
Panel Data for Thai Listed Manufacturing Enterprises 
I. Introduction 
 In recent years, Thailand has faced a real challenge of sustaining its growth and 
escaping from its “middle income trap 1 (World Bank Office -Thailand, 2008). For Thailand 
to transition to higher income and growth in the long term, measures to improve productivity 
and competitiveness over the long term in all sectors (agriculture, industry, and services) are 
urgently needed. In particular, measures to increase productivity in the manufacturing sector, 
as the main sector in Thailand accounting for 40.10 percent of Thai GDP in 2008 (Bank of 
Thailand, 2009), are very important. The manufacturing sector has been one of the most 
important sectors in the East and Southeast Asian countries. Economic growth in this region 
since the early 1980s has arisen primarily from the rapid expansion in manufacturing exports 
(Jongwanich, 2007). To analyse how best to increase Thailand’s productivity it is also 
necessary to conduct a firm level analysis, since firms are the engines of economic growth. It 
is crucial, therefore, to examine how firms can enhance their performance, as this has a direct 
impact on the overall growth of the economy.  
The major problems causing firm-level inefficiency could be obviously observed from 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The Crisis highlighted problems of lack of transparency in 
corporate governance and a corrupt and mismanaged banking system (i.e., excessive lending 
to non-productive assets, lack of adequate debt monitoring) among the crisis-affected 
countries in South East Asia as well as Thailand. The problem of weak corporate governance 
was related to, for example, the dominance of controlling shareholders, the separation of 
voting and cash flow rights (or the disparity between control and ownership), and the limited 
protection of minority rights (Claessens et al., 2000). Not only the inefficient environmental 
factors discussed above caused manufacturing inefficiency in Thailand but firm-specific 
factors (i.e., inadequate firm size, lack of business experience, lack of research and 
development (R&D) investment, inefficient managerial skills, lack of internal competition, 
 
1 Thailand moved rapidly from a  low‐income country to a middle‐income country during the period between   
the  1970s  to  mid‐1990s.  This  resulted  from  the  rapid  growth  in  per  capita  income  during  that  period. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, real GDP growth has slowed and is now was lower than that of other developing 
countries in East Asia. With intensifying global competition and higher commodity prices, Thailand confronts a 
real challenge of  sustaining  its growth and becoming a higher  income country  (World Bank Office‐Thailand, 
2008, p. 2).  
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and lack of external competition or lack of learning-by-exporting experience) also affected 
the inefficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms. After the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis the corporate governance system has been strengthened in Thai capital 
markets, such as through enhancing the institutional framework for accounting and auditing 
practices, improving the disclosure practice of listed companies, encouraging best practices 
for directors of listed companies, and relaxing foreign ownership controls (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 2000, Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005, Sally, 2007). However, these 
environmental and firm-specific factors that affect firm inefficiency have not been 
empirically examined for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This paper aims to fill this 
gap, and is organized as follows: Section II provides a review of the literature. Sector III 
describes data sources and data classification. Section IV presents empirical models which 
consist of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the two-stage data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) approaches. Hypothesis tests are analysed in Section V. The empirical results of both 
approaches are provided and discussed in Section VI. Implications from the results are 
provided in Section VII. Some conclusions are also provided in the final section.  
II. Literature Review  
Very few empirical studies have examined the effect of leverage (financial 
constraints) on a firm’s technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003, Sena, 2006, Mok et 
al., 2007, Weill, 2008). Sena (2006) and Mok et al. (2007) used the leverage ratio represented 
by the ratio of total debt to total assets (the D/A ratio) to investigate the effect of financial 
constraints on firm technical efficiency. This debt ratio captures how much a firm is 
constrained in its expansion. Their empirical results revealed that firms with high leverage 
tend to experience a decrease in their technical efficiency. This was confirmed by Goldar et 
al., (2003) who applied the quick ratio current assets inventory /current liabilities   to 
examine the importance of the liquidity of Indian engineering firms on their technical 
efficiency, and found that liquidity has a significantly negative effect on firm technical 
efficiency. There are a number of theoretical studies focusing on the relative efficiency of 
internal versus external financing (Jensen, 1986, Gertner et al., 1994, Stein, 1997). The 
conclusions from which are still controversial. Gertner et al., (1994) and Stein (1997) 
supported that a firm’s capital is allocated more efficiently through internal financial 
resources than external ones, since internal financing can increase monitoring incentives, 
decrease entrepreneurial incentives, and have better asset redeployability. In other words, 
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internal financing improves the efficiency of investments and resource allocation. However, 
Jensen (1986) argued that internal financing causes an agency problem, since managers have 
the opportunity to abuse internal funds, and they can easily mobilize internal funds to 
maximize their own interests and lack the desire or necessity to maximize shareholders’ 
interests due to the lack of external monitoring from banks or financial institutions. Empirical 
studies have also revealed inconclusive results. For example, Gökçekus (1995) found no 
significant effects of the relative efficiency of internal versus external financial resources on a 
firm’s technical efficiency for the Turkish rubber industry. Kim (2003) used the ratio of total 
interest payments on borrowed capital to total capital as a proxy for external financing. He 
found that this has a positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency. Focusing on research and 
development (R&D) a number of empirical studies have found that R&D has a positive effect 
on a firm’s technical efficiency (Aw and Batra, 1998, Kim, 2003, Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003, 
Sheu and Yang, 2005). Kim (2003) found that the ratio of R&D spending to total output has a 
significant positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency for the textile and chemical 
industries, but such a relationship was not found in the fabrication industry. Sheu and Yang 
(2005) also found that R&D, as measured by annual R&D expenditure deflated by the 
general Wholesale Price Index (WPI), positively influences technical efficiency in Taiwan’s 
electronics industry.  
Ownership structure is also one of the important firm-specific factors affecting a 
firm’s performance. A number of empirical studies have examined the effect of controlling 
ownership on a firm’s performance based on accounting or financial measures (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Leech and Leahy, 1991, Wiwattanakantang, 
2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007), but their empirical results are still 
inconclusive. There are both costs and benefits associated with controlling ownership. The 
presence of controlling ownerships (shareholders with large stakes) can deteriorate firm 
performance, since the interest of controlling shareholders may not align with those of non-
controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Bebchuk et al., 1999).  There is a 
possibility that large shareholders may conduct corrupt activities (i.e., using a firm’s cash 
flows for their own benefits). On the other hand, according to agency theory, controlling 
shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed shareholders, since a high level of 
ownership concentration can reduce agency costs. In practice, controlling ownership can be 
measured by the percentage of equity owned by the largest five shareholders 
(Wiwanttanakantang, 2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007). In the case 
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of Thailand, Wiwanttanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) found that 
controlling ownership is positively associated with a firm’s performance, as evaluated by 
accounting or financial measures. Similarly, managerial ownership2 can help align the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If 
managers’ interests coincide more closely with those of shareholders, the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders are alleviated. A number of empirical studies have found a 
positive linear and non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance as measured by financial profitability (Pfeffer, 1972, Morck et al., 1988, 
Wiwattanakantang, 2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003). Very few empirical studies have 
examined the effect of managerial ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency (see Liao et al. 
(2010)). Liao et al. (2010) calculated the percentage of equity owned by managers and the 
percentage of equity owned by the board, and examined the effects of these variables on a 
firm’s technical efficiency as measured by a two-stage DEA. Their results found that 
managerial and board equities are positively related with a firm’s technical efficiency, but 
their results are not statistically significant. In addition, very few empirical studies examined 
the effect of executive remuneration on a firm’s technical efficiency. Baek and Pagán (2003) 
conducted a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure a firm’s technical efficiency, and 
found that the level of CEO total compensation is positively associated with a firm’s 
technical efficiency for S&P 1,500 firms.  
Focusing upon different types of firm ownership a number of empirical studies have 
also found a positive association between foreign ownership and technical efficiency 
(Fukuyama et al., 1999, Goldar et al., 2003, Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004). Empirical 
studies focusing upon the relationship between family ownership and firm performance have 
been examined in the finance literature, but very few studies linked family ownership with a 
firm’s technical efficiency. Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) used dummy variables for 
family and partnership ownership to examine the effect of family and partnership ownership 
on a firm’s technical efficiency, conducted using the two-stage DEA approach. Their results 
revealed a significantly negative association between family and partnership ownership and 
firm technical efficiency for 280 Israeli firms. Claessens (2000) defined the controlling 
shareholder (ultimate owner) by adopting cut-off shareholding levels of 10 percent and 20 
percent for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korean, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
 
2 Managerial ownership is defined as being top executives (i.e., managers and board of directors) who also hold 
a firm’s shares (i.e., common stocks and preferred stocks).    
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and Thailand. In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantung (2001) and Yammeesri and Loadh 
(2003) investigated the effect of family ownership on a firm’s performance based on 
accounting or financial measures. Both studies, however, used a cut-off shareholding level of 
at least 25 percent for Thai listed enterprises, since shareholders must have at least 75 percent 
of their voting rights to obtain the absolute power over the public limited firm due to the 
Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 of Thailand (Section 31). Hence, this study adopts 
a cut-off shareholder level of at least 25 percent in classifying different types of firm 
ownership.  
A number of empirical studies have also investigated the effect of export participation 
on a firm’s technical efficiency (the learning-by-exporting hypothesis). Kim (2003) used the 
ratio of exports to total revenues as a proxy for export intensity, and found that exports 
positively affect technical efficiency for the food and paper industries, but such a finding is 
not found in the textile, chemical, and fabrication industries for Korean manufacturing 
industries. Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003) used a dummy variable for exports, but found no 
effect of exports on firm technical efficiency for 2,370 Danish firms. Granér and Isaksson 
(2007) used a dummy variable as a proxy for export participation, and found that exports 
significantly increased the technical efficiency of Kenyan manufacturing firms. Many 
empirical studies have also investigated the effect of firm size on a firm’s performance based 
on a firm’s technical efficiency. Their results are quite varied being based on different 
countries and sectors. Empirical studies have also used different proxies for  firm size, which 
can be represented as either (i) total assets (see Kim (2003), Sheu and Yang (2005), Liao et al 
(2010)), (ii) the number of employees (see Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004)), and (iii) 
intermediate inputs Lundvall and Battese (2000), Hossain and Karunaratne (2004), 
Oczkowski and Sharma (2005). Moreover, a number of empirical studies also investigated 
the effect of firm age on a firm’s technical efficiency (see Lundvall and Battese, 2000). Their 
findings are also quite mixed depending upon respective countries and sectors. The effect of 
government assistance on  firm performance is also examined by a number of studies 
(Tzelepis and Skuras, 2004, Girma et al., 2007). Their findings are still ambiguous depending 
on the countries and industrial sectors studied.  
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III. Data Sources and Data Classification 
Data Sources 
The raw data used in this study was obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand, 
which consists of (i) the list of board of directors and major shareholders, (ii) financial 
reports, (iii) annual reports of the Thai listed companies (the Form 56-1). Financial reports 
consist of five major components: (i) an auditor’s report, (ii) statements of income, (iii) 
balance sheet statements, (iv) statements of cash flows, and (v) notes to financial statements. 
In addition, there are two types of financial reports: (i) an unconsolidated financial report and 
(ii) a consolidated financial report. In this study, annually consolidated financial reports are 
used, since all business activities of listed firms including their subsidiary companies are 
recorded in annually consolidated financial reports. Form 56-1 is an annual company report 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), where all Thai listed firms are 
obligated to disclose their annual business performance for shareholders and investors. Form 
56-1 consists of three main parts: (i) executive summary, (ii) company issuing securities, and 
(iii) confirmation of accuracy. Part (ii) is used for this study, which consists of the listed 
company’s information, such as (a) risk factors and risk management, (b) nature of business 
operation, (c) business operations of the company, (d) research and development, (e) business 
assets, (f) future plans, (g) legal disputes, (h) capital structure, and (i) management, (j) 
internal control, (k) related transactions, (l) financial position and operation performance, and 
(m) reference information.  
Data Classification 
This study classifies manufacturing listed firms from among listed firms into eight 
industrial sectors. The SET’s eight industrial sectors consist of (1) Agro and Food Industry 
which can be sub grouped into (i) Agribusiness and (ii) Food and Beverage; (2) Consumer 
Products which can be sub grouped into (i) Fashion, (ii) Home and Office Products, and (iii) 
Personal Products and Pharmaceuticals; (3) Financials which can be divided into (i) Banking,  
(ii) Finance and Securities, and (iii) Insurance; (4) Industrials which can be classified into (i) 
Automotive, (ii) Industrial Materials and Machinery,  (iii) Paper and Printing Materials, (iv) 
Petrochemicals and Chemicals, and (v) Packaging; (5) Property and Construction which can 
be divided into (i) Construction Materials, (ii) Property Development, and (iii) Property fund; 
(6) Resources (energy & utilities); (7) Services  which can be divided into (i) commerce, (ii) 
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Health Care Services, (iii) Media & Publishing, and (iv) Professional Services (Tourism & 
Leisure and Transportation & Logistics); (8) Technology which can be divided into (i) 
Electronic Components and (ii) Information and Communication technology. Besides eight 
industrial sectors there are also 22 listed firms under rehabilitation (NPG) in 2008. The 
securities of these listed firms have been suspended until they can meet the SET’s rules and 
regulations in order to resume their trading again. With regard to International Standard 
Industrial Classification of all economic activities (ISIC), it is necessary to remove some 
listed firms that are not classified as manufacturing firms. In addition, this study also includes 
listed manufacturing firms that had been delisted from the SET during 2000 to 2008. As a 
result, 178 listed manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008 will be used to conduct 
the empirical analysis of this study, which can be summarized in Table 1 as follows:  
 Table 1: Classification of Listed Manufacturing Firms in the SET during 2000 to 2008 
No of  ctors   se     Manufacturing Sectors   No of firms  No of firms   
1  Agro & Food Industry   
1.1  Agribusiness 20    
1.2 Food & Beverage 20    
Total      40 
2  Consumer Products   
2.1 Fashion  1  8   
2.2 Home & Office Products 1  1   
2.3 Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals 4    
Total      33 
3  Industrials    
3.1 Automotive  12    
3.2 Industrial Materials & Machinery 1  9   
3.3 Packaging  13    
3.4 Paper & Printing Materials 2    
3.5 Petrochemicals & Chemicals 13    
Total      59 
4  Publishing  7 
5  Construction Materials 27 
6  Technology (Computer components) 12 
   Total listed manufacturing firms     178 
 Source: Authors  
IV. Empirical Models 
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the two-stage Data Envelopment 
Analysis approaches are used to conduct the empirical analysis. The differences between the 
SFA and the DEA approaches are that the SFA requires functional forms on the production 
frontier, and assumes that firms may deviate from the production frontier not only due to 
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technical inefficiency but also from measurement errors, statistical noise or other non-
systematic influences (Admassie and Matambalya, 2002). In addition, the SFA requires 
strong distribution assumptions of both statistical random errors (i.e., normal distribution) and 
non-negative technical inefficiency random variables (i.e., half-normal distribution for time-
invariant inefficiency model (see Pitt and Lee (1981)), and truncated normal distribution for 
both the time-invariant inefficiency model (see Battese and Coelli (1988)) and the time-
variant inefficiency model (see Battese and Coelli (1992),1995)). The DEA approach, 
however, does not impose functional forms, and uses linear programming to construct a 
frontier that envelops the observations of all firms. Hence, all firms are compared relative to 
the “best” performing firms. It also overcomes restrictions on the production and distribution 
of various residuals.    
The Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model 
The basic stochastic production function frontier was independently proposed by 
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) within a cross-sectional 
context. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) applied the method of maximum likelihood 
under the assumptions of a half-normal model, assuming the inefficiency components 
(  are independently and identically distributed half-normal random variables with 
variance     ~    0,  and the statistical components (  are independently and 
identically distributed normal random variables with zero means and variances 
   ~    0, .  In addition, Schmidt and Sickles (1984), p. 367) noted that stochastic 
frontier models that use cross-sectional data suffer from three serious difficulties. First, the 
technical efficiency of a firm can be estimated but its estimates may not be consistent, since 
the variance of the distribution of technical efficiency, conditional on the whole error term, 
for each individual producer does not vanish (becomes zero) as the size of the cross section 
(sample size) increases. Second, maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic production 
frontier model and the separation of technical inefficiency from statistical noise, both require 
strong distributional assumptions of (i) technical inefficiency (e.g., half-normal distribution) 
and (ii) statistical noise (e.g., normal distribution). Third, maximum likelihood estimation 
requires an assumption that the non-negative technical inefficiency error components are not 
related to the independent variables in the model but, in fact, if firms perceive the level of 
their technical inefficiency they tend to adjust their input choices relative to the level of their 
technical inefficiency. In other words, the firms’ technical inefficiency might be correlated 
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with their input choices. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) also suggested that having access to 
panel data can avoid the disadvantages mentioned by Schmidt and Sickles (1984). First, panel 
data (repeated observations on a sample of firms) can relax the independent and strong 
distributional assumptions. Second, adding more observations for each firm can provide more 
information compared with cross sectional data, and the firm’s technical efficiency can be 
estimated consistently since the number of observations of the firm begins to increase.  
According to Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Kumbhakar and Lovel (2000), the 
preferred model is the stochastic frontier production function model based on the time-variant 
efficiency model of Battese and Coelli (1995). The model of Battese and Coelli (1995) allows 
the technical efficiency levels to change over time, since firms expect to learn from their 
learning-by-doing experience. As the panel becomes larger the technical efficiency effects 
would change. The model consists of two main components. The first component is to 
estimate the time-varying stochastic frontier production function which contains two random 
errors: (i) random errors ( ) and non-negative random variables ( ). The first random 
errors, which are assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal random 
variables with zero means and variances,     ~    0, , can be observed, for 
example, when the problems of omitted variables and model misspecification arise. The 
second non-negative random variables which are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed normal random variables as truncations at zero with Zit  means and 
variances     ~    0,  are known as the technical inefficiency effects. In addition, 
these two random variables are assumed to be independently distributed for all time periods 
(t=1,2,…..,T) and all firms (i=1,2,….,N).  
The second component links firm-specific variables (i.e., types of firm ownership, 
firm age, and firm size) with the inefficiency effects or the non-negative random variables. In 
other words, this part aims to examine what firm-specific variables significantly affect the 
firm’s inefficiency. The stochastic frontier production function and the inefficiency effects 
will be simultaneously estimated by the method of maximum likelihood (ML) which has 
desirable large sample (or asymptotic) properties. More specifically, the ML estimator is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient (Coelli, 2005, p. 218). FRONTIER Version 4.1 is used 
to conduct a single - step process in which the stochastic frontier production and the model of 
technical inefficiency effects are estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum 
likelihood estimation (Quasi-Newton methods) (see Coelli (1996)). This software utilizes the 
parameterisation from Battese and Corra (1977) by replacing  and   with  
and / . The technical inefficiency for the  firm in the Battese and Coelli 
(1995) model is given by TE  = exp (- U ,) = exp (-Z δ - W ). Applying the model of 
Battese and Coelli (1995), the stochastic frontier production functions in the Cobb-Douglas 
and translog functional forms are tested for adequate functional form. The Cobb-Douglas 
functional form can be written as:  
       ln    ln    ln                  (1.1)  
The translog functional for  can be written as:  m
n     l    l   ln      n         l
                    
n    
ln  
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W
 =   Sales revenue deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI) 
here: 
  
 =   Employee expenses deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI)                                    
        of firm i at time t 
   
 =   Net productive fixed assets deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of                                       
        of firm i at time t 
     
 = Intermediate inputs deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of                                       
      capital goods of firm i at time t 
   pu s of firm i
 =    Random error ( ~ 0, )) 
         intermediate in t  at time t 
 =    Non-negative random variable (or technical inefficiency) ( ~ Zit , )) 
The Inefficiency Effects Model can be written as follows: 
 
  5         
            +  &                          
                       +                      
               +                                                                                                                                           (1.3)         
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Whe
 = Leverage of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of total debt to    
re: 
         
  = Liquidity of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of current assets    
     total assets (the D/A  Ratio) 
         
 = Dummy for internal financing; 
     to current liabilities (the Current  Ratio) 
               = 1 if firm i at time t borrows from related parties.  
          
 = External financing, represented by total interest expenses deflated by  
               = 0, otherwise          
          
 = Executive Remuneration of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio    
    the general Producer Price Index (PPI) 
            
5  = Controlling ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the  
    of top executive and board member remunerations to total employee expenses  
           
  = Managerial ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the percentage of equity               
      percentage of equity owned by the five largest shareholders 
          
   =  Exports of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of export revenue   
       owned by top executives and board members 
           
&   =  D y for Research and Development: 
       to total sales revenue  
umm
                 &  = 1 if firm i at time t has R&D.  
             
   =   for a family-owned firm: 
                = 0, otherwise          
Dummy
                    = 1 if firm i at time t is a family-owned firm. 
            
  =  D y for a foreign-owned firm: 
                  = 0, otherwise          
umm
                    = 1 if firm i at time t is a foreign-owned firm. 
           
 =  D estic-owned firm: 
                   = 0, otherwise          
ummy for a dom
                  = 1 if firm i at time t is a domestically-owned firm. 
          
  =  D y for a hybrid-owned firm: 
                    = 0, otherwise          
umm
                       = 1 if firm i at time t is a hybrid-owned firm. 
           
  =  Size of firm i at time t, represented by the logarithm form of total assets 
                   = 0, otherwise          
 = Age of firm i at time t, represented by the number of operating years   
 = D  for Government support  ummy
             = 1 if firm i at time t receives Board of Investment (BOI)’s support.          
          
   = D  for foreign cooperation  
                     = 0, otherwise          
ummy
                        = 1 if firm i at time t engages in foreign cooperation 
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                               = 0, otherwise          
        = Random error (( ~ 0, )) 
Basic descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned above are provided in the 
Appendix. 
Two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can also be used to predict 
technical efficiency, which involves the use of a linear programming method to construct a 
non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data (Coelli et al., 2005, p.162). The 
term “Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)” was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and 
Rhodes (1978) (or the CCR model). The CCR model proposed an efficiency measurement 
obtained by maximizing the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs, subject to the given 
constraints that all efficiency measures cannot be greater than 1. In addition, this model does 
not require a priori specification of weights or explicit functional forms in examining the 
relationship between inputs and outputs (Banker et al., 1984). Unlike the CCR model, 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) (or the BCC model) considered variable returns to scale 
(by assuming the convexity assumption:  I1 1 , which allows separation between 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The BCC model, therefore, can determine whether a 
firm is operating under increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale for multiple 
outputs and inputs. This study applies the variable returns to scale (VRS) linear programming 
problem to predict the technical efficiency for the first-stage of the two-stage DEA approach 
(see F re, Grosskopf, Logan (1983) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984)). The VRS 
assumes that firms are not operating at an optimal scale due to imperfect competition, 
government intervention, and financial constraints (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition, the output 
orientated model is used, assuming fixed input amounts and maximized output production. 
The VRS linear programming program under the output orientated model can be written as 
follows: 
                                                              ,       ,
          st           i=1,2,….,n,     0, 
                                                                 0, 
           I1 1, 
                                                                          0,                                               (1.4) 
Where:   is a scalar. 1    0,  and  is the proportional increase in outputs ( ) 
which can be obtained for the  firm, while holding input amounts ( ) constant.   is the 
efficiency score for the  firm.   is an output vector for the  firm.    is an input vector 
for the  firm.  is a vector of constants.  defines non-increasing returns to scale 
(NIRS).  
The DEA problem under equation (1.4), for example, takes the firm i, and radially 
expands the output vector of the firm i ( ) as much as possible, while still remaining within 
the feasible output set. The inner-boundary of this output set is a piece-wise linear production 
possibility curve which is determined by all the firms in the sample (see Figure 1). The DEA 
model in linear programming (1.4) also replaces the convexity constraint which is imposed 
for the VRS: I1 1  for  I1 1. The modified  I1 1 indicates that the VRS can only 
be non-increasing. In other words, the constraint:  I1 1 is set to ensure that the  firm is 
compared with firms that are smaller than it (see Coelli et al. (2005), p.174)). The linear 
programming problem (1.4) can also be illustrated in Figure 1 as follows: 
Figure 1: Efficiency measurement under the output-orientated DEA model  
Output (Y)  
                                                                                                                                                                               
Input (X) 
P 
G 
CRS Frontier 
A0
NIRS Frontier 
  
 
 VRS Frontier 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
Note: Figure 1 is modified from Figures 3.7 and 6.3 of Coelli et al. (2005, p. 55, 171). The original Figures 
described Input- and Output- Orientated Technical Efficiency Measures and Returns to Scale (Figure 3.7), and 
the scale efficiency measurement under the input-orientated DEA model (Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 1 only explains the case of one output and one input as an example. The VRS 
technical inefficiency is expressed, for example, by the distance between P to . The CRS 
technical inefficiency is expressed by the distance between P to   . The difference between 
the CRS and VRS technical inefficiencies, which is given by the distance between 
 to  ,  indicates scale inefficiency. In addition, the VRS technical efficiency can be 
expressed by the distance ratio A  to AP, while the CRS technical efficiency can be 
expressed by the ratio A  to AP. The scale efficiency is simply the ratio of the CRS technical 
efficiency to the VRS technical efficiency (AP / AP ). However, the disadvantage of this 
measure of scale efficiency is that it does not indicate whether a firm is operating under 
increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale. The term, non-increasing returns to scale 
(I1 1  technical efficiency is imposed in conducting further analysis for increasing, 
constant, and increasing returns to scale. If the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) 
technical efficiency score is equal to the VRS technical efficiency score, for example, as is 
the case for point G, then decreasing returns to scale exist. If the NIRS technical efficiency 
score and the VRS technical efficiency score are not equal (as  is the case for point P), then 
increasing returns to scale apply (see F re et al. (1983)). If the CRS technical efficiency is 
equal to VRS technical efficiency, constant returns to scale apply.  
 One problem of the piece-wise linear frontier in DEA is that firms operating parallel 
to the axes causes the problem of “slacks”. For instance, a firm operating on the production 
frontier (or on the efficient point), but the amount of inputs can be reduced without changing 
the output, is called an “input slack” (or input excess) problem for the input-orientated model. 
For the output-orientated model this problem is also known as “output slack” (or output 
excess), since a firm’s production can be increased without using any more inputs. There are 
a number of ways in which to treat the problem of slack (e.g., one-stage DEA, two-stage 
DEA, and multi-stage DEA). One-stage DEA solves the problem through linear 
programming, for example the output-oriented model (1.4), where slacks are calculated 
residually. Two-stage DEA maximizes the sum of slacks required to move from the first-
stage projected point (as for point  in Figure 1) to an efficient point (as for point 
 in Figure 1 . However, two-stage DEA is applicable when there is only one efficient point 
to select from the vertical facet, but it is not applicable when there are two or more 
dimensions of slacks. As a result, multiple-stage DEA can be useful, since it is invariant to 
units of measurement and its efficient projected points have input and output mixes that are 
similar to those of the inefficient points. These slack treatments can be applied by the Data 
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Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Program (DEAP) version 2.1. For the DEAP software 
there are three choices with respect to the treatment of slacks, these are (i) one-stage DEA, 
(ii) two-stage DEA, and (iii) multi-stage DEA. Coelli et al. (2005, p.198) recommended 
multi-stage DEA. Hence, multi-stage DEA will be selected in this study to predict the VRS 
technical efficiency as well as the CRS technical efficiency for the first-stage of the two-stage 
DEA model.The second stage of the two-stage DEA model is conducted by regressing 
environmental variables on the firm’s VRS technical inefficiency scores which are predicted 
from the first step of the two-stage DEA model. The firm’s technical inefficiency scores are 
used as the dependent variable, which is obtained by subtracting the efficiency scores 
estimated from the DEA model from “one”.  The set of environmental variables are used as 
independent variables for the two-stage DEA model. The estimated inefficiency scores are 
normally bounded between zero and one. Applying the method of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) with such a dependent variable that its values are bounded between zero and one will 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimators, since the OLS method is likely to predict 
inefficiency scores which are greater than one (Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, the Maximum 
Likelihood estimation for a Tobi m  adopted, which is given as follows:  t odel is
                                        (1-     ∑ +                                    (1.5)   
W ere: h
  = Inefficiency scores of firm i and time t. 1-
      = Unknown param ter to be estimated for each environmental variable j at time t e
    =  Random error (( ~ 0, )) 
V.  Hypothesis Tests  
There are a number of null hypotheses for the SFA approach that will be tested such 
as (i) the validation of the Cobb-Douglas production function, (ii) the absence of technical 
progress, (iii) the absence of neutral technical progress (iv) the absence of inefficiency 
effects, (v) the absence of stochastic inefficiency effects, (vi) the insignificance of joint 
inefficiency variables (see Table 2). A likelihood-ratio test (LR test) is used to test these 
hypotheses, which can be con :ducted as follows   
                       2 log   log                                  (1.6) 
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Where, log   and log   are obtained from the maximized values of the log-
likelihood function under the null hypothesis ( ) and the alternative hypothesis ( ), 
respectively. The LR test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with parameters 
equal to the number of restricted parameters imposed under the null hypothesis ( ), except 
hypotheses (iii) and (iv) which have a “mixed” chi-square distribution (see Kodde and Palm 
(1986)). Hypotheses (iii) and (iv) involve the restriction that    is equal to zero, which 
defines a point on the boundary of the parameter space (Coelli, 1996, p. 6). From Table 2 the 
null hypothesis (i) is to test whether the Cobb-Douglas production function is adequate for 
Thai listed manufacturing firms. Following equations (1.1) and (1.2) the null hypothesis 
                  0   is 
strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sectors. 
Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production function is not an adequate specification for the case 
of the SET’s manufacturing sector, compared with the specification of the Translog 
production function model. This also indicates that input and substitution elasticities are not 
constant among firms (see Lundvall and Battese, 2000).  
The null hypothesis (ii) that there is no technical progress       
  0  is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s 
manufacturing sector, indicating that technical progress exists. Under the translog 
specification technology for (1.2), the percentage change in output in each period due to 
technological change (t) is given by  =  + 2  t (see Coelli et al., 2005). From Table 3 
technological change affects the percentage change to output by 0.091+2* (-0.05)* t. The 
slope of   in the translog production function (1.2) is negative, which is given by -0.05, also 
indicating that technological progress tends to decrease over time. The null hypothesis (iii) 
that technical progress is neutral    0           0  is also rejected at the 5 percent 
level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector. This indicates that technical change 
not only merely affects average output, but also changes marginal rates of technical 
substitution. In other words the marginal rate of substitution is not dependent on time, 
indicating that Hicks neutral technology does not exist for the SET’s manufacturing sector. 
From Table 3 the estimates of  and   are also significantly negative and positive, 
respectively, for the SET’s manufacturing sector. This evidence implies that there is the 
existence of labour-using and capital-saving technical progress for the SET’s manufacturing 
sector over the period 2000 to 2008. The null hypothesis (iv) which specifies that the 
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inefficiency effects are absent from the model     …    0   is strongly rejected 
at the 5 percent level of significance, which implies that the model of inefficiency effects 
exists for the case of the SET’s manufacturing sector.  
The null hypothesis (v) that the inefficiency effects are not “stochastic” ( 0   is 
strongly rejected, implying that the model of inefficiency effects is not reduced to a 
traditional mean response function. In other words, all the explanatory variables in the 
inefficiency effects model are not included in the production function, implying that the 
inefficiency effects model exists and therefore the estimated parameters can be identified in 
the model of inefficiency effects. As a result the average response function in which all listed 
manufacturing firms are assumed to be fully technically efficient is not found for the case of 
the SET’s manufacturing sector, given the assumptions of the translog stochastic frontier and 
the inefficiency effects model. In addition, if the estimate of the variance parameter ( ) is 
close to one, it indicates that overall residual variation (  and  ) highly results from 
inefficiency components (  . From Table 3 the estimated  (0.872) is high for the SET’s 
manufacturing sector, indicating that much of the variation in the composite error term is due 
to inefficiency effects (  .  
The last null hypothesis specifies that inefficiency effects are not a linear function of 
all explanatory variables     0 . In other words the null 
hypothesis specifies that all parameters of the explanatory variables are equal to zero. All LR  
test statistics are greater than the critical value of an approximately chi-square distribution 
(see Table 2) at the 5 percent level of significance, implying that the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal to zero is strongly rejected at the 5 percent 
level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector, given the specification of the 
Translog stochastic frontier and the model of inefficiency effects. According to the rejection 
of the last null hypothesis test, the model of inefficiency effects of the SET’s manufacturing 
sector can be assumed to be independently and identically distributed as truncations at zero of 
the normal distribution with mean,   and variance,  (see Battese and Coelli (1995)). 
For the two-stage DEA model the null hypothesis that all parameters of the explanatory 
variables are equal to zero is also rejected at the 5 level of significance (see Table 4). In 
addition, the majority of the estimates of the Translog production frontier parameters are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing 
sector (see Table 3). It is also common to observe that some of the individual coefficients of 
the Translog stochastic frontier are not statistically insignificant due to high multicollinearity 
among the inputs (see Lundvall and Battese (2000), Oczkowski and Sharma (2005)). 
                      Table 2: Statistics for the Hypotheses Tests of the Stochastic Frontier and Inefficiency       
                      Effects Models  
  Source  Auth rs’ estimates: o  
 Note: All critical values of the test statistics are subject to the 5% level of significance; * indicates a  mixture of 
the  distribution (see Kodde and Palm, 1986). 
 Manufacturing Sector 
Null Hypothesis LR Critical Decision 
Statistics Value
(i) Cobb-Douglas 
:    
           
  0  211.94 18.31 Reject  
(ii) No techn l pro
  0  
:    
ica gress 
  
25.93 11.07 Reject  
(iii) Neutral te nica
  :    0  
ch l change 
33.92 7.81 Reject  
(iv) No inefficiency effects 
:       0   628.05 29.55* Reject  
(v) Non stochastic inefficiency 
( : 0  1207.1 2.71* Reject  
(vi) No joint inefficienc  
: 0   
y
292.66 27.59 Reject  
VI. Consistency of the Results from Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis  
 Average technical efficiency scores for the SET’s manufacturing sector predicted by 
the SFA and the DEA are quite close, given by 0.812 and 0.887 respectively (see Table 6). 
Average technical efficiency scores obtained from the SFA normally should be lower than 
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those scores obtained from the DEA, since technical efficiency scores predicted by the DEA 
cannot be separated from the non-negative technical inefficiency components ( ) from 
random error terms ( s).  However, if the estimated  is close to 1 this implies that the error 
variation is mainly due to inefficiency effects. For this study  is given by 0.872 which 
indicates that overall error variation (    and  ) is mostly due to inefficiency components 
(  , and insignificantly caused by random error terms ( . Undoubtedly, technical 
efficiency scores can also be smaller than those scores obtained from DEA (see Sirasoontorn 
(2004)).  
As discussed in Figure 1 the advantage of the DEA approach is that it can examine 
whether each of the listed manufacturing firms are operating under increasing returns to scale 
(IRS), decreasing returns to scale (DRS), or constant returns to scale (CRS). From Table 6 
there is strong evidence that approximately 86 percent of the listed manufacturing firms were 
operating under decreasing returns to scale (DRS) on average over the period 2000 to 2008, 
given the specification of the output-orientated model. For a comparison analysis between the 
SFA and two-stage DEA approaches only the empirical results of the two-stage DEA 
approach under the variable returns to scale (VRS) are used to compare with the empirical 
results obtained from the SFA, since the VRS technical inefficiency scores obtained from the 
two-stage DEA are basically equivalent to “pure” technical inefficiency scores obtained from 
SFA. Moreover, the CRS technical inefficiency scores obtained from DEA can be 
decomposed into (i) pure technical inefficiency (or CRS technical inefficiency) and (ii) scale 
inefficiency (see Coelli et al., 2005, p. 172). The empirical results of both the SFA and the 
two-stage DEA are found to produce quite consistent results, which are summarized in Table 
5. Both approaches confirm that leverage (financial constraints) has a significantly positive 
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector, implying that 
financially constrained firms tend to utilize their financial resources and control input costs 
effectively, leading to an enhancement in their technical efficiency. To confirm this 
conclusion, both estimation approaches also confirm that a firm’s leverage is found to be 
statistically significantly negatively related with its technical efficiency for the SET’s 
manufacturing sector. Both approaches also confirm that external financing has a statistically 
negative association with a firm’s technical efficiency, but the relationship is very weak since 
the size of the “external financing” coefficient is very small. In addition, “internal financing” 
is also found to have a negative effect on a firm’s technical efficiency, but the results from 
both approaches are statistically inconclusive. This implies that the agency problem exists for 
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the use of internal funds, since managers do not appear to maximize shareholders’ interests or 
have strong incentives to abuse internal funds. This is especially the case in underdeveloped 
countries where firms’ managerial rights are not fully developed and their information is not 
fully publicized, and therefore managers attempt to maximize their benefits rather than the 
firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p.134). 
The coefficient for “executive remuneration” is also found to be statistically 
significant for both approaches, indicating that listed manufacturing firms with higher levels 
of executive remuneration tend to have more technical efficiency. According to the finance 
literature regarding ownership structure, the empirical results from both approaches confirm 
that managerial ownership has a significantly positive relationship with the firm’s technical 
efficiency. This indicates that the agency problem is reduced, since managerial ownership can 
help align the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. Controlling ownership 
is found to have a positive association with the firm’s technical efficiency, but the 
significance results from both approaches are statistically different. This result supports the 
agency theory that controlling shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed 
shareholders, since a high level of ownership concentration can reduce agency costs.  
Learning-by-exporting evidence is also found for Thai listed manufacturing 
enterprises, since the empirical evidence from the two approaches confirm that the coefficient 
for “exports” has a significant and positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency. This 
result implies that export market experience (i.e., new product designs and production 
methods), which is gained from communication between foreign partners and exporting 
firms, tends to improve the technical efficiency of exporting firms. However, research & 
development (R&D) is found to be statistically negative with the firm‘s technical efficiency 
among Thai listed manufacturing firms. This result is different from many empirical results 
that R&D has a positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency (see Part II). Such a negative 
finding also implies that most listed manufacturing firms doubtfully reported their R&D 
activities in their annual report, and in fact did not intend to implement them seriously.    
Focusing on the classification of different ownership types among listed 
manufacturing firms the results from both approaches indicate that family-owned firms, 
foreign-owned firms, and hybrid-owned firms have a statistically positive relationship with 
firm technical efficiency. For domestic owned-firms the significance results from both 
approaches are statistically different. Joint-owned firms have a statistically negative 
relationship with a firm’s technical efficiency, as indicated by a positive constant coefficient 
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(the base firm). Foreign-owned firms perform the best among other types of owned firms, 
followed by family-owned firms, hybrid-owned firms, and domestic-owned firms, given 
joint-owned firms as the base firm. Moreover, there is strong evidence that a firm’s size tends 
to have a statistically positive effect on its technical efficiency.  The effect of a firm’s age on 
its technical efficiency is found to be ambiguous due to the difference in both coefficient 
signs and significance results. Similarly, the relationship between government assistance and 
a firm’s technical efficiency is found to be inconclusive due to the same significance results 
but differences in the coefficient signs. Lastly, foreign cooperation has a negative impact on a 
firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector, but such a finding is 
statistically weak due to the difference in the significance results between these two 
approaches. 
VII. Implications from the Results 
Dealing with unbalanced panel data Frontier Version 4.1 can be used to analyse the 
time-variant efficiency model of Battese and Coelli (1995). The advantage of the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) approach under the specification of Battese and Coelli (1995) is that it 
allows investigation of technical progress through an estimated production function. For the 
DEA approach the investigation for technological progress can be referred, for example, to 
the use of Malmquist TFP index which can be decomposed into “technical efficiency change” 
and “technological change”. A Malmquist TFP index analysed by the DEA, however, can 
only be applied for the case of balanced panel data. The DEA approach can examine types of 
returns to scale for the firm’s production in both the firm-level and industry-level context, but 
the SFA approach can investigate types of returns to scale only for the industry-level context 
through an aggregate of estimated input elasticities (See Coelli et al., 2005, p. 304).  
This can be calculated by the sum of estimated input coefficients obtained from an 
estimated production function, given the specification of a Translog frontier production 
function (see Table 3). The result, given by 0.545 ( + )3, indicates the existence of 
moderate decreasing returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Similarly, the 
DEA approach also highlights that approximately 86% of listed manufacturing enterprises, on 
average, operated under decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Table 
6). The significance coefficients of time interacted with capital (  and labour ) are 
negative and positive, respectively, indicating that technical change has been labour-using but 
        
3 The coefficients  and   are statistically significant at the 5 % level of significance, but is not statistically 
significant at the 5 % level of significance (see Table 3).   
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capital-saving (see Table 3). This result implies that technological progress for Thai listed 
manufacturing firms still relies on basic production resources, such as the labour input. 
Similarly, the negative coefficient of time squared (  also confirms that technological 
change has been decreasing over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Table 3). According to the 
empirical evidence from these two approaches, industry-specific policy guidelines are also 
recommended to promote technical efficiency. Policy guidelines can be implemented as 
follows: (i) promote more firm ownership participation for a group of people (i.e., workers, 
administrative staff, managers, and owners) who control or participate in listed 
manufacturing firms, and encourage listed manufacturing firms to set up attractive rewards 
for top management and board of directors when firms achieve a certain level of profits as 
planned; (ii) encourage more foreign participation in listed manufacturing firms; (iii) 
encourage listed manufacturing firms to engage in more export participation; (iv) promote an 
increase in firm size. Further study can also focus on the following research issues, such as (i) 
investigate the SET’s sub-manufacturing sectors, (ii) study non-linear effects of firm-specific 
variables (i.e., firm size, firm age, controlling ownership, and managerial ownership) on a 
firm’s technical efficiency, and (iii) investigate the effect of a firm’s technical efficiency on 
its export performance (the self-selection exporting hypothesis). In addition, there might be 
other inefficiency variables or other proxy variables (i.e., R&D expenditures) which can 
affect technical efficiency, but they are beyond the scope of this study due to data 
unavailability.  
VIII. Conclusions 
This study has applied the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the two-stage Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. Dealing with unbalanced panel data, the SFA 
approach seems to be more favourable than the DEA approach in analysing firm technical 
efficiency and the model of inefficiency effects, since the analysis for technical progress 
conducted by the DEA approach is not applicable for unbalanced panel data. The DEA 
approach, however, can analyse types of returns to scale (i.e., decreasing returns to scale 
(DRS), increasing returns to scale (IRS), and constant returns to scale (CRS)) for both the 
firm-level and industry-level contexts, but the SFA approach only analyses returns to scale 
for the industry-level context. Both estimation approaches can be applied for robustness. The 
empirical evidence from both approaches highlighted that Thai listed manufacturing firms 
had been operating under decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 2008. 
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Table 3: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of the Stochastic Frontier 
Production Function and the Inefficiency Effects Model  
Stochastic  Parameters  Stochastic Inefficiency               Parameters  Inefficiency
Variables  Frontier Variables              Effects 
Constant  3.871*  Constant    13.257* 
(0.512) (1.850)
log(L)**  1.002* Leverage   ‐0.038*
(0.132) (0.019)
log(K)**  ‐0.700* Liquidity   0.219*
(0.109) (0.016)
log(M)**  0.243 Internal financing   0.635*
(0.152) (0.139)
t  0.091* External financing   0.0007*
(0.043) (0.00006)
½ (log(L)2) 
 
0.079* Executive remuneration   ‐0.433*
  (0.022)   (0.212)
½ (log(K)2)  ‐0.101* Controlling ownership   ‐0.035*
    (0.026)   (0.003)
½ (log(M)2)  0.129* Managerial ownership   ‐0.023*
    (0.028)   (0.004)
½ (t2)  ‐0.005 Exports   ‐0.012*
    (0.005)   (0.002)
log(L)*log(K) 
 
0.088* R&D   0.746*
  (0.023)   (0.150)
log(L)*log(M)  ‐0.211* Family ‐owned firm   ‐3.681*
    (0.026)   (0.281)
log(L)* t  ‐0.020* Foreign ‐owned firm    ‐3.910*
    (0.008)   (0.504)
log(K)*log(M) 
 
0.089* Domestic‐ owned  firm   ‐1.420*
  (0.019)   (0.206)
log(K)*t  0.016* Hybrid ‐owned firm   ‐2.726*
    (0.006)   (0.192)
log(M)*t  ‐0.004 Firm size   ‐0.777*
(0.007) (0.125)
    Firm age
 
  ‐0.040*
    (0.005)
    Government assistance
 
  ‐0.716*
    (0.171)
    Foreign cooperation   0.191*
      (0.097)
    Variance parameters  
    sigma‐square  
 
1.080*
    (0.067)
    gamma   0.872*
      (0.012)
    Log‐likelihood function     ‐745.05
 Source: Authors’ estimates 
Note:  Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level; ** L is the labour input, K is the capital input, and M is the intermediate input (see equation 
(1.2)). 
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Table 4: Maximum-Likelihood Tobit Estimates for Parameters of the Two-Stage DEA 
approach 
VARIABLES PARAMETERS DEA DEA
(VRS) (CRS)
Left censoring (value) at zero         93  19
Uncensored observations    1214  1288
     Total observations    1307  1307
Dependent variable: Technical inefficiency (VRS)  d Technical inean fficiency (CRS) 
Constant  0.5838*  0.2297*
(0.0294)  (0.0301)
Leverage  ‐0.0048*  0.0015
(0.0012)  (0.0012)
Liquidity  0.0023*  0.0030*
(0.0006)  (0.0006)
Internal financing  0.0052  0.0090*
(0.0037)  (0.0038)
External financing  0.0000*  0.0000
(0.0000)  (0.0000)
Executive remuneration ‐0.1018*  ‐0.1850*
  (0.0186)  (0.0185)
Controlling ownership  ‐0.0002  ‐0.0003*
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Managerial ownership  ‐0.0004*  ‐0.0004*
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
Exports  ‐0.0001**  0.0000
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)
R&D  0.0145*  0.0134*
  (0.0044)  (0.0045)
Family‐ owned firms  ‐0.0272*  ‐0.0226*
  (0.0067)  (0.0070)
Foreign‐ owned firms  ‐0.0428*  ‐0.0342*
  (0.0076)  (0.0078)
Domestic‐ owned firms ‐0.0067  ‐0.0244*
  (0.0083)  (0.0086)
Hybrid ‐owned firms  ‐0.0224*  ‐0.0232*
  (0.0084)  (0.0087)
Firm size  ‐0.0295*  ‐0.0019
(0.0017)  (0.0018)
Firm age  0.0000  0.0009*
  (0.0002)  (0.0002)
Government assistance 0.0076**  0.0123*
  (0.0040)  (0.0042)
Foreign cooperation  0.0030  0.0032
(0.0033)  (0.0034)
      Error Distribution  0.059* 0.062*
(0.001) (0.001)
      Log likelihood (unrestricted)     1594 1740
      Log likelihood              1405 1596
       LR test                          377* 288*
       Critical value                          27.59 27.59
Source: Authors’ estimates                                                                                                                               
Note:  Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level;**indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level; *** Inefficiency 
scores are regressed by a constant. 
Table 5: Comparison of the Results of Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters  
between the SFA and the Two-Stage DEA approaches 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
Dependent variable:  
Technical inefficiency   Manufacturing Sector 
  SFA (pure)  DEA(VRS)
Independent variables :   
Constant +* +* 
Leverage ‐* ‐* 
Liquidity +* +* 
Internal financing +* + 
External financing +* +* 
Executive remuneration ‐* ‐* 
Controlling ownership ‐* ‐ 
Managerial ownership ‐* ‐* 
Exports ‐* ‐** 
R&D +* +* 
Family owned firm ‐* ‐* 
Foreign owned firm ‐* ‐* 
Domestic owned firm ‐* ‐ 
Hybrid owned firm ‐* ‐* 
Firm size ‐* ‐* 
Firm age ‐* + 
Government assistance ‐* +** 
Foreign cooperation +* + 
      
Note:  * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level;**indicates that the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
The SFA approach also found that technical progress had been decreasing over the 
period 2000 to 2008, and had relied on basic production resources such as labour input. 
Focusing on what factors significantly influence a firm’s technical inefficiency both 
parametric and non-parametric approaches are found to produce empirically consistent results 
(see Table 5). The empirical results reveal that financially constrained firms tend to improve 
their technical efficiency through the effective control of input costs and financial resources. 
On the contrary, financially healthy firms are likely to neglect increasing their technical 
efficiency due to financial liquidity. External financing tends to decrease the firm’s technical 
efficiency, but its importance is very weak due to a very small estimated coefficient. 
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Table 6: Average Efficiency Scores and Types of Returns to Scale (by the Number of 
Listed Manufacturing Firms) 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
Efficiency Scores Returns to Scale (by number of firms)
Year  CRSTE  VRSTE  SCALE DRS % IRS % CRS  %
2000 
SFA  ‐  0.807  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.814  0.871  0.936  100  73% 33  24%  4  3% 
2001 
SFA  ‐  0.803  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.838  0.895  0.938  109  81% 23  17%  3  2% 
2002 
SFA  ‐  0.803  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.832  0.896  0.93  115  85% 18  13%  3  2% 
2003 
SFA  ‐  0.807  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.89  0.927  0.96  114  83% 18  13%  5  4% 
2004 
SFA  ‐  0.821  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.826  0.901  0.917  139  95% 5  3%  2  1% 
2005 
SFA  ‐  0.817  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.779  0.878  0.889  138  91% 12  8%  2  1% 
2006 
SFA  ‐  0.82  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.789  0.878  0.9  140  89% 15  10%  2  1% 
2007 
SFA  ‐  0.816  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.784  0.876  0.897  141  91% 12  8%  2  1% 
2008 
SFA  ‐  0.812  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.787  0.87  0.906  135  88% 14  9%  5  3% 
2000 ‐ 2008 
SFA  ‐  0.812  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
DEA  0.814  0.887  0.918  126  86% 17  12%  3  2% 
Note: From the left section CRSTE is the constant returns to scale technical efficiency; VRSTE is the variable 
returns to scale technical efficiency; SCALE is the scale efficiency. From the right section DRS is the 
decreasing returns to scale technical efficiency; IRS is increasing returns to scale technical efficiency; CRS is 
constant returns to scale technical efficiency.
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There is evidence that internal financing has a negative relationship with a firm’s 
technical efficiency, but the empirical results of both approaches are statistically different. 
This result highlights that managers tend to utilize internal funds ineffectively due to lack of 
external monitoring. Kim (2003, p.134) also emphasized that this normally exists in several 
underdeveloped countries where firms’ managerial skills are not fully strengthened and their 
information is not fully disclosed, and therefore there is an opportunity for managers to 
maximize their benefits rather than the firm’s value. Controlling and managerial ownerships 
have a significantly positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency. This result implies 
that a group of people who receive direct benefits from the firm through dividends relative to 
the level of their cash flow or voting rights tend to monitor the firm carefully and effectively. 
On the contrary, dispersed shareholders or managers who do not hold any ownership over a 
firm’s cash flow or voting stocks are likely to monitor the firm ineffectively, since they 
perceive that they only receive less dividends or monthly salaries. Similarly, executive 
remuneration is found to have a significantly positive effect on technical efficiency. In 
practice, the amount of bonuses or increased salaries that executives (i.e., board of directors 
and managers) will receive depends upon the firm’s annual net profits. In some listed firms, 
the amount of executive remuneration (i.e., bonuses) that executives receive is based on the 
percentage of the firm’s annual net profits. Hence, a firm that provides high executive 
remuneration tends to achieve an increase in technical efficiency.  
The empirical evidence for both estimation approaches also indicates that exporting 
firms are also likely to improve their technical efficiency due to their learning-by-exporting 
experience (i.e., new product designs and production methods). Focusing on the relationship 
between types of firm ownership and technical efficiency it was found that foreign owned 
firms perform the best, followed by family owned-firms, hybrid-owned firms, and domestic-
owned firms, given joint-owned firms as the base firm category. There is strong evidence 
from both approaches that foreign-owned firms, family-owned firms, and hybrid-owned firms 
have a significantly positive effect on technical efficiency, except domestic-owned firms 
which produce a difference in the statistically significant results of both approaches, and 
joint-owned firms which have a significant negative effect on technical efficiency. Firm size 
is also one of the factors that positively affects the firm’s technical efficiency due to 
economies of scale. However, the effects of firm age and government assistance on technical 
efficiency are still inconclusive (see Table 5). Foreign cooperation is found to have a negative 
effect on technical efficiency, but the results from both approaches are statistically different. 
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Appendix: Data Summary 
Variables  Unit of Variables Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Observations
Output          
      Ln (Sales revenue)  Natural Logarithm  9.95 9.88 14.56 5.49  1.36  1309
Inputs:             
      Ln (Labour expenses)  Natural Logarithm  7.64 7.66 11.84 3.71  1.15  1309
      Ln (Fixed productive)  Natural Logarithm  8.84 8.68 13.61 3.57  1.56  1309
      Ln (Intermediate inputs) Natural Logarithm  9.51 9.40 14.26 5.28  1.45  1309
Time trend  No. of years  5 5 9 1  3  1309
Finance:             
      Leverage  Ratio  0.57 0.43 29.13 0.01  1.5  1309
      Liquidity  Ratio  2.4 1.57 46.2 0  2.81  1309
     Internal financing  Dummy (ratio)  0.35 0 1 0  0.48  1309
     External financing  000 Baht  1747 203 140304 0  7721  1309
R&D  Dummy (ratio)  0.8 1 1 0  0.4  1309
Ownership structure:             
    Controlling ownership  Ratio  58.81 58.82 99.69 5.44  16.51  1309
    Managerial ownership  Ratio  20.55 12.70 96.53 0  21.69  1309
Types of owned firms:             
    Family‐owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.53 1 1 0  0.5  1309
    Foreign‐owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.19 0 1 0  0.39  1309
    Domestic owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.12 0 1 0  0.32  1309
    Joint owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.07 0 1 0  0.26  1309
    Hybrid owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.09 0 1 0  0.29  1309
Executive remuneration  Ratio  0.14 0.09 7 0.0032  0.32  1309
Exports  %  32.68 19.32 100 0  33.53  1309
Other factors:             
    Ln (total assets)   Natural Logarithm  14.76 14.54 19.47 11.73  1.27  1309
    Firm age  No. of years  26 24 95 0  12  1309
    Government assistance  Dummy (ratio)  0.62 1 1 0  0.49  1309
    Foreign cooperation  Dummy (ratio)  0.31 0 6 0  0.54  1309
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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